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Local Regulation of Aircraft to
Reduce Noise: Santa Monica Tests
the Limits of Burbank
I INTRODUCTION
The number of aircraft flight operations increases each year in
the United States.' Although manufacturers of business jet and
propeller driven aircraft have become more sensitive to the noise
created by these airplanes in the vicinity of airports, 2 present tech-
nology does not indicate a substantial decrease in engine noise in
the near future. 3 Although the large jet aircraft operated by com-
mercial airlines have drawn most of the attention, ninety-eight per-
cent of the civil aircraft in the United States are general aviation
aircraft; this category includes all aircraft except those operated by
the airlines. 4
1. "In the period 1939 to 1969, domestic air transport passenger plus cargo traffic
increased at an average annual growth rate of about 18.1 percent This rate of
increase exceeded by four times the growth rate of the general U.S. economy
and all other modes of domestic travel." EPA, THE ECONOMCfC IMPACT OF
NOISE 9 (1971) [throughout this article, Environmental Protection Agency is
referred to as EPA]. See also ADMINISTRAToR, EPA, REPORT ON AIRCRAY-
AIRPORT NOISE 4-6 (1973) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
2. See HR. REP. No. 1463, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) ("[T]he committee ex-
pects manufacturers, air carriers, [and] all other segments of the aviation
community... to continue and increase their contributions toward the com-
mon goal of quiet.").
3. See S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1968) ("A completely quiet air-
plane will not be developed in the near future.... [But] the Federal Gov-
ernment must assure that the potential reductions are in fact realized."). See
also EPA, AIRCRAFr/AIRPORT NOISE STUDY REPORT, NOISE SOURCE ABATE-
MENT TECHNOLOGY AND COST ANALYSIS INCLUDING RETROFTrING 5.2 (1973)
("Further reductions in engine-generated noise may have limited effective-
ness, since it appears that a noise floor, due to external aerodynamic flow, is
present during the approach and landing pattern. This... has been esti-
mated to generate a noise level of approximately ... [currently required]
levels minus 5 to 10 EPNdB.").
4. DEPT OF TRANSP. & NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., CIVIL AVIATION RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY STUDY-SUPPORTING PAPERS 3.32 (1971)
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Due to political pressure placed upon officials by persons living
in the airport vicinity, local governments have adopted various reg-
ulations aimed at reducing aircraft noise.5 The Supreme Court
struck down certain regulations in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.6 Nevertheless, municipalities are again moving to-
ward regulation of aircraft because of the substantial questions left
unanswered by the Burbank decision.7
This comment will deal with current attempts to reduce airport
noise at the local level through the regulation of aircraft, particu-
larly the ordinances adopted by the city of Santa Monica, Califor-
nia.8 Perhaps the most significant and practical alternatives in
dealing with airport noise involve the regulation of land use sur-
rounding the airport 9 and in approach and departure zones.10
However, for many existing airports, the surrounding land uses
have long been established," and the only feasible alternative per-
ceived by local authorities is regulating the actual operation of air-
craft.
[hereinafter cited as CrVIL AVATION POLICY STUnY]. The study noted: "Gen-
eral aviation aircraft range from small, single-place piston aircraft to very
large jet transports and rotorcraft. - . . [A] lthough general aviation generates
less than 10% of the total domestic air passenger-miles, it utilizes 20 times as
many airports as domestic air carriers .... " Id. The total number of aircraft
in the general aviation fleet on December 31, 1969, was 130,806. Id. "Based on
an expected average growth rate of 5.3% per year, by 1985 approximately
287,000 general aviation aircraft... must be anticipated .... " Id. (citations
omitted). That rate has proved slightly optimistic because the expected
number of 187,770 at the end of 1976 was reported by the the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to be actually 178,304. FAA GENERAL AVIATION NEWS,
Jan. 1978, at 14.
5. See 115 CONG. REc. 32178-259 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) (Compilation
of State and L ocal Ordinances on Noise Control). "
6. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
7. Id. at 635-36 n.14. See note 104 & accompanying text infra. This movement
will probably increase as air traffic continues to grow as a result of airline
deregulation.
8. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE §§ 10100-10144 (1978). The validity of various sec-
tions of the code has been challenged in Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of
Santa Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., filed July 29, 1977).
9. See EPA REPORT, supra note 1, at 101-04, which suggests use of various tech-
niques including requirements for open space, higher noise insulation in
building codes, and other traditional land use tools.
10. Economic studies have been used in attempts to compare the costs of aircraft
noise with the costs of aircraft noise abatement, and the economic measure of
the benefits of aircraft noise abatement. See, e.g., EPA, THE ECONOIC IM-
PACT OF NOISE 12-36 (1971), which attempts to measure the cost of aircraft
noise by looking to court awards in litigation for compensation for loss of
property value, noise easements, and noise damage. Id. at 12. The limited
information available indicated a 15-20 percent drop in fair market value of
improved real estate and a 40 percent decline in the value of vacant lands. Id.
at 18. See also CIvIL AvIATION POLICY STUDY, supra note 4, at 5.6-5.7.
11. EPA REPORT, supra note 1, at 103-05.
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II. THE SANTA MONICA REGULATORY SCHEME
The city of Santa Monica, California, has long been concerned
with airport noise, and has been active in litigation over noise reg-
ulation. 12 The Santa Monica Municipal Airport is owned and oper-
ated by the City of Santa Monica.13 The city's concern regarding
noise is prompted, at least in part,14 by the number of flight opera-
tions occurring at that airport. Indeed, in 1976 Santa Monica Mu-
nicipal Airport was the forty-fifth busiest airport in the United
States,15 with nearly all of its traffic consisting of general aviation
12. See, e.g., United States v. City of Santa Monica, Civ. No. 75-1332 MML (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 24, 1975); Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480,
101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
13. 58 Op. CAL. A~r' GEN. 345, 346 (1975). The first parcel of land was acquired in
1926 and consisted of about 128 acres including Clover Field, an existing air-
field. The city has purchased additional lands over the years and the airport
now consists of about 215 acres. Id.
14. Another important factor is that "[t] he airport is surrounded on all sides by
single family residential property ... The areas surrounding the airport are
desirable; the value of an average home being in excess of one hundred thou-
sand dollars ($100,000)." Brief for Defendant at 9, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n
v. City of Santa Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., filed July 29, 1977).
Still another factor is that "[t]he land north of the runway is not leased for
airport related uses.... [O]ne million (1,000,000) square feet... has been
leased to tenants who are in the process of construction of an industrial-pro-
fessional complex unrelated to aircraft sale, service or training." Id. at 5. In
fact, the entire airport " is zoned for industrial use (M-2)." Id. This pressure
for financial return greater than that available from airport related operations
is similar to the pressures which have resulted in the recent closings of some
112 "privately-owned but open-to-the-public airports." FAA GENERAL AVIA-
TION NEWS, Mar. 1978, at 14. Some 120 others may close within the next 10
years unless solutions are found to the problems which are mainly "financial,
particularly high property taxes and the high cost of capital improvements
and maintenance." Id.
15. Brief for Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n, Amicus Curiae at 5, Santa Monica
Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., filed July
29, 1977):
The annual report submitted by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion for air traffic activity within the United States discloses that the
Santa Monica Municipal Airport had 266, 474 aircraft operations dur-
ing Fiscal Year 1976 .... To provide a more complete picture, the
same report shows Los Angeles International Airport had 467,479 air-
craft operations during the same period, a volume which gave it sixth
ranking; Santa Ana had 627,441 operations and ranked second; Van
Nuys was third with 614,355; Long Beach fourth with 553,113; and Tor-
rance eighth with 448,233.
Id. The Santa Monica operations number is equivalent to 730 takeoffs or
landings each day, or, using a 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. period only, one takeoff or
landing every 84 seconds.
Of the annual number of operations, about half are classified as "itiner-
ant" operations, which are defined "as takeoffs and landings excluding touch
and go operations." Brief for Defendant at 6, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v.
City of Santa Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., filed July 29, 1977). It is
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aircraft. At one point, the city considered closing the airport com-
pletely.16 Instead of closing the airport,'7 the city modified its ex-
tensive regulatory scheme with the goal of reducing resultant
noise.18
Section 10100 of the Santa Monica Municipal Code, the "regula-
tory purposes" section, originally provided for the operation of the
airport "as a public air terminal facility for the promotion and ac-
comodation of air transportation, general aviation and recreational
flying."'19 That section now indicates the intention of the city to
govern the use of the airport "to the full limit of the authority
which the City... possesses as the owner, operator, and proprie-
tor of said airport... and.., to the full extent otherwise provided
by law ... .-"20 The following reasons are given for the adoption of
the subsequent provisions:
[T]o provide for a utilization of the airport facility which is compatible
with adjacent residential, industrial, and commercial uses, to provide a
minimum of interference with the peace and enjoyment of the citizens
surrounding the airport, a minimum of environmental damage, and a mini-
mum of noise and air pollution commensurate with compatible airport
use.
2 1
Section 10101, the "night departure ban" provision, also was
amended in 1977.22 While the section still provides that "[t] he air-
port shall be open for public use at all reasonable hours of the day
not clear how many of these "itinerant" operations are of an interstate na-
ture, and how many are commenced and completed within California.
16. 58 Op. CAL Arr'Y GEN. 345, 346 (1975). "[I]t is apparent that the City has
entered into numerous contracts and leases wherein it has contracted away
its rights to deal freely with the Airport property .... These contractual
agreements... leads [sic] to the conclusion that the City may not at...
present... cease using the Airport for airport purposes." Id. at 351-52 (foot-
note omitted).
17. See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
18. SANTA MONICA, CAL, CODE §§ 10100-10144 (1978). The original section 10105A
(ban on night jet departures) was adopted in 1967. Santa Monica, Cal., Ordi-
nance 75CCS (Mar. 14, 1967). Section 10105B (SENEL limit) was added in
1973. Ordinance 909CCS (Feb. 27, 1973); see note 35 infra. Sections 10105A
(total jet ban) and 101OSA1 (assisting violation of jet ban) were amended to
the current version in 1975. Ordinance 991CCS (Mar. 18, 1975). Section
10105A2 (helicopter training prohibition) was added in September of 1977.
Ordinance 1068CCS (Sept. 13, 1977). Sections 10100 (regulatory purposes)
and 10134 (Airport Director discretion) were changed in 1977 also. Ordinance
107OCCS (Oct. 25, 1977). Section 10101 (night departure and night engine
start-ups ban) was amended to its current version later that same year. Ordi-
nance 1075CCS (Dec. 13, 1977). Section 10111C (weekend touch & go ban)
was added in early 1978. Ordinance 1076CCS (Jan. 24, 1978).
19. SANTA MONICA, CAL, CODE § 10100 (1975) (prior to amendment by Santa
Monica, Cal., Ordinance 1070CCS (Oct. 25, 1977)).
20. SANTA MONICA, CAL, CODE § 10100 (1978).
21. Id. § 10100(C).
22. See note 18 supra.
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and night,'" the additional language provides that "night takeoffs
or engine start-ups are prohibited between the hours of 11:00
o'clock P.M. and 6:00 o'clock A.M., Monday through Friday and
11:00 o'clock P.M. and 7:00 o'clock A.M. on Saturday and Sunday. ' 24
The "night departure ban" section provides a specific exception
for "an emergency involving life, or death ... [as long as] approval
[for takeoff] is obtained before take-off. '25 This approval may be
given by the Airport Director, or, in his absence, the Watch Com-
mander of the Santa Monica Police Department. 26
Section 10104, the "minimum altitudes" section, concerns the
operation of aircraft over the city. It provides:
No aircraft shall be flown or operated below the minimum air traffic pat-
tern altitude of one thousand feet above mean sea level, except when ap-
proaching a runway for landing or while climbing to pattern altitude after
a take-off. No aircraft shall be flown or operated in the traffic pattern when
the cloud base is reported to be less than one thousand feet measured
from mean sea level.27
This regulation appears very similar to the general federal regula-
tion regarding minimum altitudes.2 However, the regulation of
operations when the applicable cloud bases are reported differs
from the federal regulatory scheme.29
Section 10105, the "general prohibition" section, provides in rel-
evant part- "No aircraft shall be operated while on the ground or in
flight in such a manner as to cause unnecessary noise. '30 But the
regulation of noise does not end with the altitude restrictions,
hours of operation limitation, and general prohibitions. Section
10105A, the "total jet ban" section, prohibits the takeoff or landing
of "any fixed wing aircraft utilizing any turbo jet or turbo fan en-
gine, in, at or upon the Santa Monica Municipal Airport at anytime
[sicj."3' Further, the section forbids providing facilities for "the
maintenance or operation of any aircraft specified in [that] sec-
tion."3 2 The "total jet ban" section also provides for a misde-
meanor criminal sanction upon its violation.3 3 Assisting,
counseling, or aiding another in violating the "total jet ban" section
23. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10101 (1978).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. § 10104.
28. 14 C.F.R § 91.79(b) (1978). See notes 139-41 & accompanying text infra.
29. 14 C.F.R §§ 91.105(c), 91.107(a) (1978). See notes 142-45 & accompanying text
infra.
30. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105 (1978) (emphasis added).
31. Id. § 10105A.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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is made a misdemeanor criminal offense under section 10105A1, 34
the "assisting violation of jet ban" section.
Section 10105B, the "SENEL limit" section,35 provides for ex-
plicit noise regulations designed to "limit the noise in residential
areas in the vicinity of Santa Monica Municipal Airport, generated
by takeoff and landing operations at said Airport. '36 Regarding im-
plementation of noise restrictions, the regulation states:
The noise levels generated by aircraft takeoffs or aircraft landings at the
Airport are to be measured at one or more positions in the vicinity of the
Airport. The measurements shall be in terms of the single event noise
exposure level (SENEL). The measured SENEL values are to be com-
pared with noise level limits established by this ordinance. An aircraft
operator whose aircraft produces noise levels which exceed the SENEL
limits shall be deemed to be in violation of this ordinance.
3 7
The initial SENEL limit established by the ordinance was "100
dB" (decibels).38 Although it is unclear from the language of the
ordinance at what altitude aircraft typically pass over the initial
measuring point established,39 typical general aviation aircraft ap-
proach the 100 dB limit as measured in level flight at 500 feet.40
Additionally, the "SENEL limit" section creates a presumption of
violation with regard to turbojet or turbofan aircraft. Thus, "unless
the aircraft operator can furnish to the City suitable technical evi-
dence that the aircraft ... can meet the noise level limits,"' 4' oper-
ation of jet aircraft is "assumed. . . [to] result in violation of the
34. Id. § 10105AL.
35. "Single event noise exposure level (SENEL)... in decibels is the noise ex-
posure level of a single event, such as an aircraft flyby, measured over the
time interval between the initial and final times for which the noise levels of a
single event exceeds the threshold noise level." Id. § 10105B (2) (d).
36. Id. § 10105B(1).
37. Id. § 10105B(3). For a concise summary of the general noise measurement
schemes, see EPA, EFFECTS OF NOISE ON PEOPLE 99-100 (1971). For a more
technical analysis, see C. BRAGDON, NOISE POLLUTION 51-62 (1970).
38. SANTA MONICA, CAT., CODE § 10105B(6) (1978). Further, "[1]n June of 1977
the [city] Staff recommended a reduction of the SENEL limit from one hun-
dred (100) dB to ninety (90) dB. The Council did not act on this recommen-
dation." Brief for Defendant at 16-17, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of
Santa Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., filed July 29, 1977).
39. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105B(4) (1978) provides:
Measurements shall be made at ground positions on or near the
center line of nominal takeoff and landing flight tracks for aircraft
operating from the Airport....
The initial measurement position shall be established within 300
feet of the intersection of Dewey Avenue and 18th Street. Additional
measurement positions may be established as needed to carry out
the purpose of this ordinance.
Id.
40. FAA ADVISORY CmcULAR No. 36-2A, MEASURED OR ESTIMATED (UNCERTIF-
CATED) A'IPLANE NOISE LEvELs 7 (Feb. 6, 1978).
41. SANTA MONICA, CODE § 10105B(9) (1978).
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noise level limits."''
Section 10105F, the "jet ban waiver" section, allows the airport
director to authorize jet aircraft takeoffs or landings if he or she
determines that "a bona fide emergency exists, and it is absolutely
necessary that such aircraft land.., for the preservation of life or
property."43
Section 10105A2, the "helicopter training prohibition" provision,
strictly forbids helicopter pattern flight training,44 and declares it
unlawful to "conduct or participate in, or aid or assist any other
person in"45 helicopter pattern training.
Section 10111, the "nighttime touch-and-go ban" section, pro-
vides that "[n] o touch and go landings shall be made during the
hours of darkness."'46 Section 10111C, the "weekend touch-and-go
ban" section, imposes a weekend ban on pattern flying by fixed
wing aircraft, low approach operations, stop and go landings, and
touch and go landings.47 The only exceptions are actions taken in
an emergency, where safety requires, or when required by the
FAA.48 These regulations attempt to restrict use of the airport to
non-training purposes at times that would ordinarily be busiest for
training purposes and at times when the greatest number of per-
sons are in their homes in the surrounding residential areas.
Section 10112A, the "departure pattern" section, prescribes a
straight out departure path to a minimum altitude of 600 feet for all
aircraft, except that "small aircraft"49 departing from Runway 2150
are advised that "it is recommended that where practicable said
aircraft should veer approximately ten degrees... to the left as
soon as possible after takeoff."51
Section 10116, the "nighttime warmup" provision, states that
42. Id.
43. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105F (1975). See note 128 infra.
44. SANTA MONICA, CAI., CODE § 10105A2 (1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 10111.
47. Id. § 10111C. This section defines a "touch-and-go" landing as "an action by
an aircraft consisting of a landing and departure on a runway without stop-
ping or exiting the runway." Id. § 10111C(1). A "stop-and-go" is defined as
"an action by an aircraft consisting of a landing followed by a complete stop
on the runway and a takeoff from that point." Id. § 10111C(2). A "low ap-
proach" consists of "an approach over the Airport for a landing where the
pilot intentionally does not make contact with the runway thereon." Id.
§ 10111C(3).
48. Id. § 10111C.
49. Id. § 10112A.
50. Id. "Runway 21" is a term used to refer to a particular strip of runway in a
particular direction of flight, e.g., aircraft using the strip of runway on a mag-
netic heading of about 210 degrees are using "Runway 21."
51. Id.
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"[d]uring hours of darkness the preflight warm up of engines shall
be conducted only at midfield at a point designated by the Airport
Director."52 The airport director receives authority under section
10134, the "Airport Director discretion" section, to "delay or re-
strict any flight or other operations at the airport and [to] refuse
take-off clearance to any aircraft,"5 3 subject to prescribed stand-
ards.54
Violation of any of these provisions is declared a misdemeanor
criminal offense under section 10143.55 In addition to criminal pro-
ceedings, the "total jet ban" section is enforced by the imposition
of a five thousand dollar landing fee and a ten thousand dollar
takeoff fee and by subjecting the aircraft to impoundment; how-
ever, the city returns impounded aircraft to their pilots and no suc-
cessful collection of these fees has yet been made.56 The "SENEL
limit" provision is enforced by a warning on the first offense and
prosecution for the second offense.57 The "night departure ban"
section has been invoked on isolated occasions against aircraft
performing medical functions. 58 The "nighttime touch-and-go ban"
and "weekend touch-and-go ban" sections are frequently violated
and are enforced by criminal prosecution.59 There is no enforce-
ment of the "helicopter training prohibition" section since all heli-
copter training operations have ceased.6 0
52. Id. § 10116.
53. Id. § 10134.
54. The standards are as follows:
1. Discretion shall not be exercised in any manner which con-
flicts with state or federal law.
2. Discretion may only be exercised where:
a) There is reason to believe that its exercise is necessary for
the protection of public health, safety, or welfare, or
b) There is reason to believe that an aircraft violates in some
manner the proprietary rights of the City ... as the own-
er/proprietor of the... Airport, or
c) Where there is reason to believe that a violation of any of the
provisions of this Article is imminent.
3. Nothing in this section shall authorize the Airport Director
... to deny access to the... Airport to employees of the federal
government, or to other persons in the case of any emergency, or to
those users ... authorized ... by law on any basis where pre-emp-
tive rights validly exist.
Id.
55. Id. § 10143.
56. Brief for Defendant at 17-18, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa
Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IEI (C.D. Cal, filed July 29, 1977).
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Santa Monica Municipal Code contains numerous provisions of other
types involving the storage, use or maintenance of aircraft at that airport
1979]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mll. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL
REGULATION
A. Commerce Clause
The Congress of the United States received the authority to reg-
ulate interstate and foreign commerce under the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution.61 Even where Congress has not
attempted regulation, states or local governments may not enact
legislation which unduly burdens interstate commerce.62
The Supreme Court, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,63 sum-
marized the test used to discover an undue burden as one which
would "impede substantially the free flow of commerce from state
to state, or [would] regulate ... commerce which, because of the
need for national uniformity, demand[s] that ... regulation...
be prescribed by a single authority."64 The Southern Pacific deci-
sion struck down a state statute placing a limit on the number of
railroad cars which could be operated on a particular train in that
state. The Court decided that there was "no doubt that the Ari-
zona Train Limit Law imposes a serious burden on the interstate
commerce." 65 The Court balanced the "total effect of the law as a
safety measure" 66 against the "national interest in keeping inter-
state commerce free from interferences which seriously impede
it. ' '67 The balance favored the uninterrupted flow of commerce.
The commerce clause analysis has been applied in the aircraft
noise regulation area as well. In American Airlines, Inc. v. City of
Audubon Park,68 the court invalidated an ordinance which prohib-
ited aircraft from flying over Audubon Park below 750 feet above
the ground.6 9 The city adjoined the principal Louisville, Kentucky
airport 7° and the typical approach path for landing on the Instru-
which do not pertain to the reduction of noise from aircraft operations. E.g.,
id. § 10114 (meaning of warning siren emergency signals); § 10122 (lien for
unpaid tiedown or parking fees); § 10125 (rental fees for use of airport in film-
ing motion pictures). No attempt has been made to analyze the validity of
these other regulations.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."
62. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1970); South Carolina High-
way Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938).
63. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
64. Id. at 767.
65. Id. at 773.
66. Id. at 775-76.
67. Id. at 776.
68. 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 1307.
70. This is a good example of a situation in which one municipality seeks to regu-
late use of a nearby airport owned, operated, and principally serving another
municipality.
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ment Landing System (ILS) glidepath 71 crossed the most distant
city limit at 442 feet above the ground and the closest city limit to
the airport at 282 feet.72 The court, in a per curiam opinion, cor-
rectly described the ordinance as an "intolerable and undue bur-
den on interstate and foreign commerce,"73 for enforcement of the
ordinance would have effectively rendered the airport unusable
since no aircraft could have taken off or landed in compliance with
the ordinance.
The district court in Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of
Burbank74 found that an ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft takeoffs
between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. was invalid under the commerce clause
because "air commerce, by reason of its speed and volume, re-
quires a single authority in control if it is to be conducted at maxi-
mum safety and efficient use of the navigable air space. '75 The
court conceded that viewed by itself the ordinance was probably
valid; but, assuming enactment on a nationwide scale by other lo-
calities, it violated the commerce clause.76 The court of appeals
affirmed on supremacy clause grounds,77 with the Supreme Court
affirming for similar reasons.78 In a dissent joined by three other
justices, Justice Rehnquist doubted the validity of the district
court's analysis because "the proper determination of the question
turns on an evaluation of the facts of each case.., and not on a
predicted proliferation of possibilities. '79 In light of the foregoing,
the potential success of a commerce clause attack on local aircraft
regulations remains uncertain.
B. Supremacy Clause-Federal Preemption
The early attempts to regulate aircraft on the local level in or-
der to reduce resultant noise were ineffectual. The ordinances
were successfully attacked under the supremacy clause.80 More
71. The glidepath is a sloping electronic guidance beam which allows an aircraft
to descend at a uniform rate while providing obstacle avoidance. See EPA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-21.
72. 407 F.2d at 1307. The altitude at which a standard Instrument Landing Sys-
tem (ILS) approach procedure terminates over the runway threshold is 200
feet. Assuming the standard descent angle of 3.0 degrees, the nearest city
limit would have been less than one hundred feet from the runway threshold.
73. Id.
74. 318 F. Supp. 914 (CD. Cal. 1970), affld on other grounds, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1972), alff'd, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
75. Id. at 928.
76. Id. at 927.
77. 457 F.2d at 670.
78. 411 U.S. at 633.
79. Id. at 654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E.D.N.Y. 1955), affld, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
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specifically, the challenges brought about a determination that lo-
cal ordinances conflicted with particular federal law8 ' or were pre-
empted by the pervasive scheme of federal regulation of aviation.8 2
The first case involving such a local ordinance, Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst,8 3 struck down an ordinance
prohibiting flights over that town at less than one thousand feet
above the ground. Aircraft approaching to land at Idlewild Air-
port,84 located about four thousand feet from the village at the
nearest point, passed over the village at altitudes as low as 450 feet.
The court held the ordinance invalid because, under the predeces-
sor of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,85 "the federal regulatory
system.., has preempted the field below as well as above 1,000
feet from the ground."8 6
The Second Circuit also invalidated an ordinance, in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead,87 which prohibited aircraft
from operating over the town if they exceeded noise limits mea-
sured on the ground. The town lies just to the east of John F. Ken-
nedy International Airport in New York, and thus the aircraft were
forced to fly around the town to avoid violating the ordinance.88
The district court in Hempstead held the ordinance invalid for
three reasons: (1) the ordinance unconstitutionally burdened in-
terstate commerce; (2) federal regulation preempted the area; and
(3) the ordinance directly conflicted with specific federal regula-
tions.89 The Second Circuit backed away from the broader ground
of preemption used in Cedarhurst,90 and specifically concluded in
Hempstead that "there is square conflict between the local ordi-
nance and federal regulation."9 1
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court, in Loma Por-
tal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,92 remained unpersuaded
by an argument "that state action affecting any aspect of flight op-
erations is precluded by the extensive pattern of federal regulation
81. E.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
82. E.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.
1956).
83. Id. at 812.
84. Idlewild is now known as John F. Kennedy International Airport.
85. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1, 52 Stat. 977 (repealed Pub. L. 85-726,
Title XIV, § 1401(b), 72 Stat. 806 (1958)).
86. 238 F.2d at 815.
87. 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
88. Id. at 376.
89. Id. at 372.
90. Id. at 376 n.4. See notes 83-86 & accompanying text supra.
91. 398 F.2d at 375-76.
92. 61 CaL 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
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in this field."9 3 Nevertheless, the court refused to enjoin noisy air-
craft from flying over a populated area near San Diego's Lindburgh
Field on state statutory grounds.94 The California court deter-
mined that "[i]t is clear that the federal legislation was not in-
tended to be exclusive. '95 The court founded this conclusion on
the portion of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which provides that
"[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing . . . but the provisions of this
chapter are in addition to such remedies.19 6
The court explained that the Cedarhurst decision was not con-
trary to its decision because "[ d] espite the preemption language
... the court was there dealing with an ordinance which 'plainly
conflicts with the federal... regulations.' ",9 The court in Loma
Portal was certainly willing to concede that a state law conflicting
with a federal law could not be enforced under the supremacy
clause. However, the court would not accept the broader argument
that federal regulations had occupied the entire field of aircraft
noise regulation.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,98 the
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance placing an 11 p.m. to 7
a.m. curfew on jet aircraft flights from the Hollywood-Burbank Air-
port in California. The Court found that "the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise . . . leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption."99 The Solicitor General had
"concede [d] that as respects 'airspace management' there is pre-
emption.'u oo
The majority opinion accepted the finding of the district court:
'"The imposition of curfew ordinances on a nationwide basis would result
in a bunching of flights in those hours immediately preceding the curfew.
This bunching of flights during these hours would have the twofold effect
of increasing an already serious congestion problem and actually increas-
ing, rather than relieving the noise problem by increasing flights in the
period of greatest annoyance to surrounding communities. Such a result
is totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statutory and regu-
latory scheme .... The imposition of curfew ordinances on a nationwide
basis would cause a serious loss of efficiency in the use of the navigable
airspace.
1 0 1
93. Id. at 591, 394 P.2d at 554, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
94. Id. at 589-90, 394 P.2d at 553, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
95. Id. at 593, 394 P.2d at 555, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
96. 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1970).
97. 61 Cal. 2d at 593, 394 P.2d at 555, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
98. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
99. Id. at 633.
100. Id. at 627.
101. Id. at 627-28 (quoting Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F.
Supp. 914, 927 (1970)).
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The dissenting opinion was not inclined to look at the problem on a
nationwide basis, preferring instead to constrain itself to the facts
of the particular case.10 2
The Court in Burbank found pervasive the regulatory scheme
embodied in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Noise Con-
trol Act of 1972, which amended the Federal Aviation Act.103 But
the Burbank decision was narrowed to its facts by the now famous
footnote which cites a letter to the Aviation Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Commerce from the Secretary of Transpor-
tation. The footnote provides:
"[T]he proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a State or local
public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing regulations or
establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can
be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport owners acting as
proprietors can presently deny the use of their airports to aircraft on the
basis of noise considerations so long as such exclusion is non-discrimina-
tory.,
0 4
Thus, it would seem that the preemption holding applies only to
municipalities which seek to regulate noise at airports which they
do not operate. The Court, in the same footnote, indicated that the
"authority that a municipality may have as a landlord is not neces-
sarily congruent with its police power."' 05 It accordingly declined
to consider "what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a propri-
etor."lO6
In Burbank, the Court reviewed the federal statutory scheme in
great detail, concluding that the "FAA, now in conjunction with
EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state and lo-
cal control."' 07 The statutes provide, in part, that "[t]he United
States of America is declared to possess and exercise complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United
States . . . .,1o8 The Administrator of the FAA is delegated au-
thority over the use of the airspace "in order to insure ... the effi-
cient utilization of such airspace."' 09
Specifically, the Court reviewed the Noise Control Act of 1972
which amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The latter act, as
amended, provides in relevant part:
(b) Consultations; standards; rules and regulations; aircraft certificates.
(1) In order to afford present and future relief and protection to the
public health and welfare from aircraft noise and sonic boom, the FAA,
102. Id. at 654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 79 & accompanying text supra.
103. 411 U.S. at 628-33.
104. Id. at 635-36 n.14 (emphasis in original).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 633.
108. 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970).
109. Id. § 1348(a).
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after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and with EPA,
shall prescribe and amend standards for the measurement... and...
such regulations as the FAA may find necessary to provide for the control
and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic boom ....
(d) Considerations determinative of standards, rules, and regulations.
In prescribing.., standards and regulations under this section, the FAA
shall-
(1) consider relevant available data relating to aircraft noise...
(2) consult with such Federal, State, and interstate agencies as he
deems appropriate...
(3) consider whether any proposed standard or regulation is consis-
tent with the highest degree of safety in air commerce...
(4) consider whether any ... regulation is economically reasonable,
technologically practicable, and appropriate for the particular type of air-
craft...
(5) consider the extent to which such... regulation will contribute
to carrying out the purposes of this section.
1 10
The Senate and House Committees both included, in their re-
ports on amendments to 49 U.S.C. § 1431 under the Noise Control
Act of 1972, statements that the relationships between the federal
government and the local governments were not affected by the
amendments.1 ' But the Senate Report contains the minority
views of Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, who advocated a pro-
vision rejected by the committee:
[Tlhis provision would have imposed a positive burden upon the operator
of the airport to exercise responsibility to regulate the number, the fre-
quency and the hours of flight or to impose land use controls so as to elim-
inate noise as an environmental problem in the area of that airport.
1 12
Senator Muskie apparently believed that locally-originated con-
trols were preempted because of the alternatives he consequently
foresaw:
The reported bill would force these people to wait for [new] emission con-
trol technology ... or on the courts to impose sufficient ... claims against
... the airport operators for creating a public nuisance .... To turn over
to the courts the responsibility of making ad hoc decisions to solve envi-
ronmental noise problems is equally unacceptable.
1 1 3
110. Id. at § 1431(b) (1), (d) (Supp. V 1975).
111. The House Report provided: "No provision of the bill is intended to alter in
any way the relationship between the authority of the Federal Government
and that of State and local governments that existed... prior to the enact-
ment of the bill." H.R. REP. No. 92-842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1972). The
Senate Report similarly stated: "This does not address responsibilities or
powers of airport operators, and no provision of the bill is intended to alter in
any way the relationship between ... the Federal... and ... State and
local governments that existed ... prior to the enactment of the bill." S. REP.
No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).
112. S. REP. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1972) (minority views of Sen. Ed-
mund Muskie).
113. Id.
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However, the majority view in the legislative proceedings re-
mains that no "change in the existing apportionment of powers be-
tween the Federal and State and local governments"" 4 was
intended. The views of the Secretary of Transportation in his let-
ter to the Aviation Subcommittee" 5 received the concurrence of
the Committee Report:
[The legislation] would not change this preemption. State and local gov-
ernments will remain unable to use their police powers to control aircraft
noise by regulating the flight of aircraft.... Airport owners acting as pro-
prietors can presently deny the use of their airports... on... noise con-
siderations so long as such exclusion is non-discriminatory...
The legislation ... will not prevent airport proprietors from excluding
any aircraft on the basis of noise considerations.
1
'
6
Accordingly, since Burbank applies only to regulations under
the municipality's police power, it will not control in an action in-
volving an airport proprietor. Moreover, where the attempted local
noise regulation directly conflicts with a federal regulation, the
federal law prevails under the previous authority." 7 However,
where no federal regulation directly conflicts, the federal preemp-
tion doctrine may be applicable. As will be suggested later in this
comment," 8 perhaps the appropriate determination is whether the
local ordinance affects the flight paths of aircraft while engaged in
the performance of flight, or takeoff or landing runs in connection
with actual flight. Under this rule, where flight of aircraft is ad-
justed in some way, preemption should apply; it would not apply
where actual flight is unaffected.
C. Equal Protection Clause
Even in the post-Burbank environment, the courts have main-
tained the two-tiered regulatory scheme for control of airport
noise. In British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York, "9
the operators of the supersonic jet Concorde obtained an injunc-
tion prohibiting enforcement of a Port Authority ban on Concorde
operations at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The court
looked to the same legislative materials as the Burbank court did
in delineating the separate roles of the federal government and the
local government airport operators. 120 After remand to the district
114. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
115. See note 104 & accompanying text supra.
116. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968).
117. See notes 91-97 & accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 147-59 & accompanying text infra.
119. 431 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), on remand, 437 F.
Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
120. 564 F.2d at 1011 n.8.
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court, the court of appeals summarized its view of the role of air-
port proprietors:
Our initial opinion in this case delineated the extremely limited role
Congress had reserved for airport proprietors in our system of aviation
management. Common sense, of course, required that exclusive control
of airspace allocation be concentrated at the national level, and communi-
ties were therefore preempted from attempting to regulate planes in
flight.... The task of protecting the local population from airport noise,
however, has fallen to the agency, usually of local government, that owns
and operates the airfield .... It seemed fair to assume that the proprie-
tor's intimate knowledge of local conditions, as well as his ability to ac-
quire property and air easements and assure compatible land use ...
would result in a rational weighing of the costs and benefits of proposed
service. Congress has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to this two-
tiered scheme, and both the Supreme Court and executive branch have
recognized the important role of the airport proprietor in developing noise
abatement programs consonant with local conditions.
1 2 1
The British Airways court held that, while the Port Authority of
New York could "subject the Concorde to reasonable noise regula-
tions,"'1 22 the Port Authority could not discriminate against that
particular type of aircraft. The evidence disclosed that the Con-
corde's "perceived noise 'footprint' was comparable to that of the
[Boeing] B707-320B.... [and] the vibrations emitted... were no
greater than those induced by long range subsonic aircraft, such as
the [Boeing] B-747 and [McDonnell-Douglas] DC-10."' 23
The court found that the regulatory scheme "mandates that
each airport operator be circumscribed to the issuance of reason-
able, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory rules defining the per-
missible level of noise which can be created by aircraft using the
airport."' 24 Because the ban of Concorde at Kennedy Airport went
beyond this level of permissible regulation in singling out a partic-
ular aircraft, the court dissolved the ban on Concorde flights to the
Kennedy Airport.
The court explicitly refused to preclude the Port Authority from
adopting "a new, uniform and reasonable noise standard in the fu-
ture, assuming the longstanding 112 PNdB rule... is deemed in-
adequate."'12  And, as noted by the concurring opinion, those
future reasonable standards "might have the effect of authorizing,
limiting or banning the use of JFK by SSTs.' 26 So, although the
local government role in reducing airport noise by regulating the
aircraft themselves appears limited, nondiscriminatory noise limit
121. Id. at 1010-11 (emphasis added, citations omitted; footnote omitted).
122. 558 F.2d at 82.
123. 564 F.2d at 1008-10 (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 1011.
125. Id. at 1013 (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. at 1017-18 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part).
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regulations may be employed to include or exclude aircraft from
use of the airport by the airport proprietor.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SANTA MONICA REGULATIONS
Under the analysis used by the courts and adopted by Congress
in the Noise Control Act of 1972, local regulations which directly
conflict with explicit federal statutes or regulations are invalid. 12 7
One of the Santa Monica regulations, the "jet ban waiver" section,
provides for an exception to the ban on jet aircraft operations
when the airport director determines that "a bona fide emer-
gency"'128 exists. However, the applicable federal regulation pro-
vides that "[t]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly
responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of
that aircraft."'129 Further, "[i] n an emergency requiring immediate
action, the pilot in command may deviate from any [FAA] rule...
to the extent required to meet that emergency.' 30
The pilot in command receives such authority, since only he or
she is fully aware of the operating limitations and conditions to
which the pilot is subject, whether they be mechanical, meteoro-
logical, or physiological. The pilot must have the freedom to ap-
proach these problems without worrying about such things as
noise ordinances. The more reasoned view would look to the na-
tional aviation scheme and, clearly, the actions of the pilot directed
to the preservation and protection of human lives and property
should override the interest of the airport proprietor in limiting in-
termittent noise around its airport. Emergencies are rare occur-
rences, and sometimes what appears to be a desperate situation
later turns out to be unharmful. Nevertheless, the interests of
safety require excessive emergency status recognition in order
that any aircraft which might have a perceived need for emergency
status should not be denied that status.
Similarly, the "airport director discretion" section arguably at-
tempts to place the power of air traffic control in the hands of the
127. See text accompanying notes 89-97 supra. See also notes 111-16 & accompany-
ig text supra.
128. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105F (1975). In United States v. City of Santa
Monica, Civ. No. 75-1332-MNL (CJD. Cal. Nov. 24, 1975), the parties stipulated
to a permanent injunction against the city to enjoin enforcement of section
10105F which would enable the airport director to make an independent judg-
ment as to whether an in-flight emergency exists, contrary to the decision of
the pilot in command of any aircraft seeking clearance to land at Santa
Monica Municipal Airport.
129. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1978).
130. Id. § 91.3(b).
[Vol. 58:494
AIRCRAFT NOISE REGULATION
airport director.131 Federal employees receive authority to issue
air traffic control clearances in order "to provide for the safe, or-
derly, and expeditious flow of air traffic."'132 Moreover, the pilot of
an airplane may not, "at an airport with an operating control tower,
taxi an aircraft on a runway or taxiway, or takeoff or land an air-
craft, unless he has received an appropriate clearance from [air
traffic control] ."33 To allow the airport director to countermand a
federal air traffic control clearance would conflict with the federal
air traffic control authority. The purposes of the federal clearance
are to provide for "expeditious flow of air traffic"' 34 and to "[pre-
vent] collision between known aircraft."' 35 The apparent purpose
of the Santa Monica regulation is compliance with noise regula-
tions. And Santa Monica, or any other municipality, must defer to
federal authority, even under the rule of Loma Portal Civic Club v.
American Airlines, Inc.13 6
The standards for exercise of that discretion 37 may be helpful
in alleviating this conflict, since one standard is that the discretion
may not be exercised to conflict with federal law.138 On the other
hand, the authority to deny or delay takeoff clearance has no
meaning so long as the control tower is in operation. While the
control tower operates, it alone exercises control over aircraft from
the time they enter a taxiway until they take off, and from the time
of touch down at landing until the aircraft exit the taxiway to the
parking area. At the same time, during nighttime hours in which
the tower is not operating, the airport director may deny takeoff
clearance without infringing on the federal authority. By proper
application of this standard, the apparent conflict between the "air-
port director discretion" section and the federal air regulations can
be resolved.
In addition, section 10104, the "minimum altitudes" section,
prohibits flights below 1,000 feet above mean sea level except dur-
ing takeoff or landing operations. 39 Assuming that the Santa
Monica area surrounding the airport is a "congested area of a
city,'u 40 the Santa Monica regulation differs from the federal regu-
131. SANTA MoNMCA, CAL., CODE § 10134 (1978). See note 53 & accompanying text
supra.
132. 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1978).
133. Id. § 91.87(h).
134. Id. § 65A5(a).
135. Id. § 1.1 (definition of "air traffic clearance").
136. 61 Cal. 2d 582, 593, 394 P.2d 548, 555, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (1964). See notes 92-
97 & accompanying text supra.
137. See note 54 supra.
138. SA TA MOICA, CAL, CODE § 10134(1) (1978).
139. Id. § 10104 (1978) (emphasis added). See also notes 27-28 & accompanying
text supra.
140. 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(b) (1978).
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lation which provides for a minimum "altitude of 1,000 feet above
the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the
aircraft."1 41 Obviously, the very lowest permissible altitude under
the federal regulation is one thousand feet above ground level.
Santa Monica's ordinance would permit flights at altitudes below
those authorized by the federal regulation; specifically, an amount
equal to the elevation above sea level of the ground at Santa
Monica. This difference may amount to a conflict between the lo-
cal interest and the federal standard, at least to the extent that
there is a federal interstate commerce interest in flights being con-
ducted at at least 1,000 feet.
The "minimum altitudes" section also prohibits flights when
the cloud bases are below 1,000 feet above sea level.142 This appar-
ently attempts to adopt a local version of a federal regulation
which provides: "Except as provided in § 91.107, no person may op-
erate an aircraft, under [visual flight rules], within a control zone
beneath the ceiling when the ceiling is less than 1,000 feet."'14 3 But
even ignoring the conflict between measurements above the
ground and above sea level,144 the Santa Monica ordinance ex-
cludes the exception provided by the federal regulation for waiver
of that requirement "when a person has received an appropriate
[air traffic control] clearance.' 4 5 Again, direct conflicts with ap-
propriate federal regulations must result in the invalidation of the
local ordinance.146
Beyond the situations in which federal regulations directly con-
flict with local regulations, federal preemption may apply to regu-
lations imposed by airport proprietors which affect the flight of
aircraft.14 7 Noise regulations which restrict aircraft by fixed loca-
tion ground measurements encourage attempts by operators to cir-
cumvent the measuring devices while still landing and departing
from the affected airport.148 Yet the Burbank footnote left open
the possible application of regulations based upon local govern-
141. Id.
142. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10104 (1978).
143. 14 C.F.R. § 91.105(c) (1978).
144. See text accompanying note 141 supra. See also 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1978), which
provides: "'Ceiling' means the height above the earth's surface of the lowest
layer of clouds ... reported [at least] as 'broken'. . and not... as 'thin' or
'partial " Id.
145. 14 C.F.R. § 91.107(a) (1978).
146. See notes 90-97 & accompanying text supra.
147. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369, 376 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
148. See note 154 infra. See also Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (NJD.
Cal. 1975), which involved regulations treated as though enacted by an airport
proprietor. The court stated. "[T]he SENEL provisions.., are a per se un-
lawful exercise of police power into the exclusive federal domain of control
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ment's status as proprietor of the airport.149 The proprietary inter-
est logically would not extend beyond the airport premises to an
area where nearly all flight paths are located.150
As previously discussed, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended, actually deals with airspace management' 5' and local
regulations covering aircraft flight unavoidably affect the proper
utilization and management of the airspace. The local interest of
the airport proprietor lies in determining the level of service de-
sired, 15 2 and excluding aircraft which are noisier than those neces-
sary to provide that level of service.
The "SENEL limit" section of the local ordinances 153 attempts
to exclude these noisier aircraft; but in its implementation with lo-
cal ground measurements it has the effect of regulating or affecting
flight paths. 15 4 The presumption of section 10105B(9) that jet air-
craft are incapable of meeting the 100 decibel limit attempts to
remedy this tendency to change flight paths by reference to the
general type of powerplant used by the aircraft.155 However, not
all jet powered aircraft are noisier than all propeller driven air-
craft.156 As a result, this presumption appears to violate the re-
over aircraft flights ... and airspace management .... [They] collid[e]
head-on with the federal regulatory scheme. .. ." Id. at 65.
149. See notes 104-06 & accompanying text supra.
150. See 115 CONG. REc. 32178 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) (Compilation of
State and Local Ordinances on Noise Control).
The Port of New York Authority has for years imposed noise limi-
tations on aircraft taking off from its airports and monitors the take-
offs to assure compliance. The Authority exercises its right to
prescribe noise limits in its capacity as an airport owner-operator
and not as an exercise of local governmental police power to regulate
in a legislative sense.... The Authority does not regulate landings
inasmuch as approach procedures are executed off the premises in
which it has a proprietary interest.
Id. at 32180 (emphasis added).
151. See notes 101, 108-09 & accompanying text supra.
152. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968). See also National Aviation v.
City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (ND. Cal. 1976); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti,
389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
153. SANTA MONICA, CAT., CODE § 10105B (1978). See notes 36-42 & accompanying
text supra.
154. See C. BRAGDON, supra note 37, at 25-26, which describes the "beat the box"
scheme used to elude permanent noise monitoring stations by having agents
alert pilots by radio when they are in the vicinity of the box after takeoff. The
pilots reduce power and maintain altitude for about 10 seconds and upon an-
other radio signal resume normal noisy flight operations.
155. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105B(9) (1978).
156. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 36-IB, CERTIFICATED AIRPLANE NOISE LEVELS 7-
9 (Dec. 5, 1977), which includes noise measurements for various aircraft,
shows the Lockheed model L-100-30 propeller driven airplane produces
higher measured noise levels (takeoff-98.4 EPNdB; landing-99.1 EPNdB)
than the Rockwell international model Sabre 60 Sabreliner jet powered air-
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quirement that regulations be nondiscriminatory. 157
The national interest lies primarily in efficient and readily avail-
able use of the navigable airspace in a national transportation sys-
tem.158 This system could not tolerate a great amount of locally
originated and non-standardized rules governing the way in which
flights are to be conducted.159 Nevertheless, local airport proprie-
tors should be able to determine the level of service offered, and to
completely exclude aircraft on a noise basis. Thus, the local au-
thority cannot simultaneously accept the benefits of the service
and deny the burden of the increased noise.
An alternative would be regulations excluding aircraft on the
basis of established measurements conducted by the federal gov-
ernment. An airport proprietor could choose a specified level of
noise to be tolerated, and exclude all aircraft by type and model
which exceed that level as determined by standard federal mea-
surements. This would eliminate any possibility of affecting flight
paths, other than total exclusion from landing or departing that
particular airport, because the regulations could only be enforced
with reference to the type of aircraft, and not to the particular
noise measurement which might be circumnavigated by noisy air-
craft. Circumnavigation may solve the local problem, but would
create a great morass of varied procedures in aviation at the na-
tional level and seriously affect the safety of flight operations.
Section 10105A of the Santa Monica rules is directed toward the
primary object of the noise regulations in that area. The airport
proprietor determined that jet powered aircraft were creating most
of the unwanted noise, and so enacted an ordinance prohibiting
the use of that airport by aircraft powered in that fashion. 60 How-
craft (takeoff-95.0 EPNdB; landing-98.5 EPNdB). Id. This is not an iso-
lated example, as other propeller driven aircraft were noisier than other jet
aircraft on one or both of the measurements. See also note 161 infra.
157. British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 564 F.2d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.
1977).
158. 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1970). See also 14 C.F.R. § 65.45(a) (1978).
159. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973),
recognizes the need for uniformity.
[T] he [FAA] Administrator has imposed a variety of regulations re-
lating to take-off and landing procedures and runway preferences.
The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety
and efficiency ... and the protection of persons on the ground...
Any regulations adopted.., to control noise pollution must be con-
sistent with the "highest degree of safety. . . ." The interdepen-
dence of these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of
federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the
Federal Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.
Id. (emphasis added).
160. Brief for Defendant at 12-13, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa
Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-rn (C.D. CaL, filed July 29, 1977).
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ever, this type of regulation ignores the fact that certain propeller
driven aircraft create more noise than particular jet powered air-
craft. 16 1
The court in British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New
York 162 refused to endorse a ban on a particular type of aircraft for
noise purposes when other types of aircraft were at least as noisy
as the excluded type.163 It concluded discriminatory regulations
were unavailable to local airport proprietors due to the following
circumstances: (1) all other authority had been preempted by
Congress; (2) the commerce clause prohibits excessive regula-
tions; and (3) there was a prior agreement between the Port Au-
thority and the Secretary of Transporation. 6 4
Whatever the theory applied, the generally accepted rule re-
mains that the criteria used to distinguish between persons
treated differently must be rationally related to the objective of the
legislative enactment. 165 Furthermore, the objective measure-
ments available thus far indicate that the "total jet ban" section
discriminates against quiet jet powered aircraft in favor of noisy
propeller driven aircraft. This distinction is not rationally related
to the clear objective of the Santa Monica noise restrictions, which
is "to provide a minimum of interference with the peace and enjoy-
ment of the citizens surrounding the airport, a minimum of envi-
ronmental damage, and a minimum of noise and air pollution
commensurate with compatible airport use."' 66 The type of power-
plant has no relevance except as to the amount of noise it pro-
duces. While it may have been true at one time that all jet
powered aircraft were noisier than propeller driven airplanes, 167 it
apparently is no longer true and is an irrational distinction for
noise reduction purposes.
The same analysis should be applied to the "weekend touch-
and-go ban", "nighttime touch-and-go ban," and "helicopter train-
161. See note 156 supra. A noise test flight conducted at Santa Monica pursuant to
the Order of Judge Hill in Santa Monica Airport Ass'n was reported to have
produced measurements indicating that, during departure, a Cessna Citation
I jet aircraft and a Learjet 35A were 8-13 dB less noisy than the propeller
driven Beech Twin Bonanza and Cessna 185 models. On approach, the jets
produced about the same amount of noise as the Beech Twin Bonanza, but
were 6-10 dB noisier than the Cessna 185. NBAA REPORT, Dec. 1978, at 1.
162. 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
163. Id. at 1010. See also note 123 & accompanying text supra.
164. British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75, 84-85 (2d Cir.), on
remand, 437 F. Supp. 804 (SX).N.Y.), modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977).
165. See Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York, 305 F. Supp. 93,
107 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ($25 landing fee held rational scheme to induce small ca-
pacity airiraft to use other facilities).
166. SANTA MONICA, CAl., CODE § 10100 (1978).
167. See note 41 & accompanying text supra.
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ing prohibition" sections. These sections appear to rationally dis-
tinguish between the types of persons treated differently. The
"weekend touch-and-go ban" section 168 bans all training flights
during the time to which it applies, and distinguishes between
flights on weekdays and on the weekend. On weekends, the vol-
ume of training flights and the number of persons present in sur-
rounding residential areas are greater than on a weekday. More
persons can be subjected to disturbing noise by a greater number
of aircraft on the weekend. The prohibition results in a shift of
these activities to weekdays, periods during which the annoyance
of those flights will affect fewer people less frequently.
These same considerations support the rationality of the
"nighttime touch-and-go ban" section. 69 Again there appears to
have been a rational determination of the desired level of service
to be offered, and a prohibition of activities beyond that point. Par-
ticularly since there would be no objection under the various legal
theories to a total prohibition on training activities, the decision
represents a rational balancing of the benefits of the pilot compe-
tence achieved by the training flights with the costs of resultant
noise to the surrounding area. Similarly, the "helicopter training
prohibition" section'7 0 represents a rational determination of the
level of service to be offered. The difference between helicopters
and other types of aircraft is the distinctive type of noise generated
by the helicopter,' 7 ' and the more lengthy and frequent nature of
training activities.
There remains the question of the validity of certain Santa
Monica aircraft noise provisions under the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. 72 Both the "night departure ban" sec-
tion 7 3 and the "total jet ban" section 7 4 involve the same analysis
and will be discussed together. Both provisions should be viewed
in terms of the balancing of interests employed in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona.7 5 The local interest in noise control is balanced
against the national interest in interstate commerce free from in-
terference. The threshold question is whether the Santa Monica
provisions interfere with interstate commerce in any way. In Na-
168. SANTA MONICA, CA., CODE § 10111C (1978).
169. Id. § 10111.
170. Id. § 10105A2.
171. Brief for Defendant at 77, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa
Monica, Civ. No. 77-2852-IH (C.D. Cal., ified July 29, 1977). "Many helicopters
emit a peculiarly annoying sound known as blade slap... [which] produces
intense peak noises and is profoundly disturbing to residents." Id.
172. See notes 61-79 & accompanying text supra.
173. SANTA MONICA, CAI., CODE § 10101 (1978).
174. Id. § 10105A.
175. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). See notes 63-67 & accompanying text supra.
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tional Aviation v. City of Hayward,176 the court considered the ef-
fect on interstate commerce "incidental at best and clearly not
excessive when weighed against the legitimate and concededly
laudable goal of controlling the noise levels . .. during the late
evening and morning hours. ' 17 7 There the court considered a
SENEL regulation which applied only during the hours between
11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. Moreover, in Hayward, other surrounding
airports were available to accept the operations excluded because
of the noise regulations. 7 8 Santa Monica is one of ten reliever air-
ports for the Los Angeles International Airport, 7 9 and all of the
flights prohibited by the "night departure ban" section and the "to-
tal jet ban" section can be completed to one of the other airports in
that area. The effect of these regulations alone almost certainly
does not adversely affect interstate commerce.
By assuming the imposition of similar noise restrictions by a
much greater number of airports in the region or on a nationwide
basis, one can envision a substantial effect upon interstate com-
merce. But the Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc.180 based its decision solely upon the preemption
doctrine,18 1 and a strong dissent indicated that the validity of such
an assumption is questionable. 82 Both the "total jet ban" provi-
sion and "nighttime departure ban" section should withstand at-
tack under the commerce clause.
In addition to these previously discussed sections, the Santa
Monica Municipal Code contains a provision aimed at noise con-
trol-that has not been challenged, and seems to be precisely the
type of regulation that ought to occur on the local level. Under sec-
tion 10116, the "nighttime warmup" provision, the airport director
designates a location for the warming up of aircraft engines during
hours of darkness. 8 3 Since most airfields are situated differently,
this has the effect of moving the noise to the spot most distant from
persons who might otherwise be disturbed. As the local authority
has the greatest knowledge along these lines, so it ought to be re-
sponsible for determining the appropriate location for engine
warmup.
176. 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 427. But see Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 65 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
178. Id.
179. Brief for Defendant at 7, Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica,
Civ. No. 77-2852-II (C.D. Cal., fied July 29, 1977).
180. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
181. Id. at 633.
182. Id. at 654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 79 supra.
183. SANTA MONICA, CA., CODE § 10116 (1978).
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Section 10112A, the "departure pattern" section,184 appears to
be worded in such a manner as to represent no real requirement,
but instead a mere suggestion. 185 Similarly, the "general prohibi-
tion" section' 86 seems so vaguely worded as to define no standard
capable of understanding or enforcement. 87
V. CONCLUSION
Although the greatest area of control available to the municipal-
ity as an airport proprietor appears to be land use planning tech-
niques, municipalities continue to regulate aircraft operations
instead. The better solution incorporates local noise regulations
setting maximum noise levels to be allowed, and an exclusion of all
aircraft by type and model that standard federal government mea-
surements determine to produce noise which exceeds those levels.
If the community later decides that noise is still a problem, it can
further reduce the noise limit and exclude additional aircraft ac-
cording to federal measurements.
Other regulations often conflict directly with the federal
scheme of air regulation; but even where there is no direct conflict,
local regulations affecting flight paths are preempted by the fed-
eral interest in airspace management. Discriminatory noise stand-
ards may also be held invalid, but no discrimination will result so
long as federal standard measurements are uniformly used to ex-
clude noisy aircraft.
The two-tiered federal-state system of aircraft noise control al-
lows local authorities to truly limit noise but forces them to bal-
ance the loss of service of the aircraft consequently excluded. This
allows the aviation system the necessary uniformity of flight proce-
dures and makes avoidance of noise standards a simple matter for
the aircraft operator. Both the local and national interests benefit
from this type of system.
William B. Cassel '79
184. Id. § 10112A, which provides, in part, that for small aircraft "it is recom-
mended that where practicable said aircraft should veer.., to the left as
soon as possible after takeoff." Id. (emphasis added).
185. Should this be enforced more strongly than the language would indicate, the
previous analysis- regarding preemption of local regulations over actual air-
craft flight ought to be applied. See notes 147-59 & accompanying text supra.
186. SANTA MONICA, CAL., CODE § 10105 (1978).
187. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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